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SURVIVING FAMINES ALONG THE KENYA COAST, ca. 1880-1980 
By Thomas J. Herlehy 
Famines put great stress on local institutions and can threaten the very 
existence of a society. In examining the impact of famines on Kenyan society 
in a historical context, one question that deserves attention is whether or 
not one society's ability to cope with food crisis has improved as a result of 
colonial interventions. Wrigley has argued, for example, that as a result of 
the establishment of British colonial rule and the incorporation of East 
Africa into the international economy, mo$t people experienced a definite rise 
in their material standard of living. In particular, he asserts that the· 
colonial state protected African families against the catastrophies of famine, 
Wrigley attributing the explosive population growth in East Africa after 1920 
to a sharp reduction in abnormal or cataclysmic deaths, especially deaths from 
famine, pestilence and war. Indeed, Wrigley asserts that after 1919, when more 
than 150,000 Kenyans died from famine and disease, there were no true famines 
(emphasis added), only severe shortages of food from time to time. l While 
the British colonial regime clearly did act to alleviate hunger during food 
·crises, other evidence suggests that in many instances local socio-economic 
ties among the peoples of Kenya were just as effective in enabling the victims 
of hunger to overcome their plight as were official government famine relief 
measures. Certainly among the Mijikenda peoples of the Kenya coast there was·a 
marked preference for mobilizing local resources to cope with famine, rather 
than relying upon government assistance. 
This paper is a case study of famine along the Kenya coast, illustrating 
how the Mijikenda peoples in particular survived the food crises that 
afflicted them between 1880. and 1980. There are nine Mijikenda peoples who 
inhabit the coastal territory extending from Vanga in the south, to Malindi in 
the north, but the vast majority live in the hinterland between Mombasa and 
Kilifi. In particular, this is a case study of the ARavai, ARihe, AKambe, 
AGiriama and ADuruma coconut palm cultivators, cattle herders, and grain 
farmers in the region between Mazeras, Kaloleni and Mariakani.2 The 
Mijikenda share this territory with AKamba cattle herders who migrated to the 
Mariakani area during the early and mid-19th century, seeking relief from 
famines in Ukambani, and with Swahili farmers and estate owners who inhabit 
the coast itself and land as far west as Jomvu.3 
The late 19th century was a time of severe food crises in East Africa with 
famine striking the coast four times between 1880 and 1900. The 20th century 
has been no less cruel to the Mijikenda, with five major food crises and 
other, minor episodes of hunger as well. While it is clear that fewer people 
died of starvation after 1920, it is important not to underestimate the very 
serious threat these more recent food crises posed. Acknowledging that an 
important distinction exists between situations of famine and those of chronic 
malnourishment and hunger,4 I would argue that the most severe food 
shortages of the 20th century still deserve to be known as famines.5 Indeed, 
both the British officials who served in the coastal region and the Mijikenda 
peoples themselves refer to the major food crises of the colonial era as real 
famines (nzala, Mijikenda vernacular, njaa, KiSwahili), and this designation 
will be utilized here as well. 
Surviving Famine During the Late 19th Century 
There were famines, really severe famines; and there were 
famine_s, other famines, not given very good names because 
they really were not very severe famines. Even if there is 
famine, there will still be some people who will not feel 
it. They will only know that there is a famine because 
they see that many people are starving and searching for 
food.6 
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Drought is the most - common cause of acute food shortage in East Africa. 
When rainfall is either insufficient or highly erratic crops will not mature 
properly and farmers will be unable to feed themselves and their families. 
Several years of below average and very erratic rainfall in the 1880s and 
1890s resulted in poor harvests, exhausting existing food reserves and 
creating famines. These famines were exacerbated by the intermittent warfare 
waged within the Kenya coastal region by Swahili and Arab slave owners and by 
Mazrui, Busaidi and British forces and their respective allies who were 
attempting to secure complete control of the area. 7 Despite the dislocation 
cause_d by raids, warfare and famine, not everyone living in the Mombasa 
hinterland suffered to the same degree. While some people did succumb to 
starvation, others managed to survive, while a few individual families 
actually benefitted from the onslaught of famine. The fate of the residents of 
the coast depended upon their ownership of food or foodproducing resources, 
and on their ability to exchange something for food. 
Mwakisenge 
The first famine to strike the Mijikenda in the late 19th century became 
known as Nzala ya Mwakisenge. A severe drought in 1883 caused a crop failure 
and food shortage that endured until 1885. There is some disagreement over the 
derivation of the name for this famine. Some Mijikenda testify that the famine 
was so severe that selfish fathers sent their sons away (sengerako, Mijikenda 
vernacular), so that they could eat alone without having to share their scarce 
food supplies with their dependents. 8 Other elders maintain that just the 
opposite occured, that people called each other together (sengerakuno, 
Mijikenda vernacular) so that everyone could share what little food was 
available with the hope that everyone would survive. 9 Another explanation 
suggests that when individuals went to buy food at the few Asian shops in the 
hinterland, crowds of people gathered there pushing and jostling one another 
(songea, KiSwahili) as they tried to buy some food. Then when people left the 
shops they behaved like the chisengesenge insect (Mijikenda vernacular) which 
walks backward and forward, entering its home by backing into it in order to 
be sure no predator is following it. Accordingly, people who were able to buy 
food went with it secretly into their homes, watching to be sure no one 
followed them in order to steal what they had bought.10 All these 
explanations may be correct, reflecting the local differences in experience 
that various peoples had at that time. But everyone does agree that it was a 
most severe famine requiring unusual efforts to survive.11 
According to contemporary observers, Mwakisenge was "the worst famine in 
thirty years" in the hinterland. The suffering caused by the famine was 
vividly described by a Methodist missionary stationed in Jomvu: 
Thousands have died and many have sold themselves into 
slavery to escape starvation. This dreadful scourge has 
ravaged whole districts and counties between here and the 
interior, westward, northwestward and southward On 
the roads leading from the coast to the· interior dead 
bodies lie thick and emit a fearful stench. Hyenas who 
gloat on carcases have become satiated and are unequal to 
the task of clearing the country of the putrid remains. 
Many ADuruma natives - lank, gaunt, bony, and with an 
expression on their faces of men and women who seem 
half-mad - have come and thrown themselves at our feet and 
piteously begged for food.12 
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Just as the famine was subsiding in 1886, a smallpox epidemic broke out, 
killing even more people throughout the hinterland.13 
Although there is no doubt that Mwakisenge was a severe famine, many 
people survived and even prospered to a degree. Cattle-owning AKamba, ADuruma 
and AGiriama families sold or slaughtered some of their livestock in order to 
eat or buy grains. Cereal farmers among the ADuruma, AGiriama, ARihe and 
AKambe were less fortunate because when their crops did not mature they were 
forced to exhaust their reserve supplies of food, and then seek work when 
subsequent plantings failed as well. Those people who were too old, infirmed, 
or young to go to work did not easily survive and many of them perished. The 
coast itself had not been so severely affected by drought, and therefore many 
Mijikenda migrated there to work for Arab or Swahili estate owners, and 
European missionaries, in order to survive.14 Some people pawned their 
wives, children and themselves in exchange for food from coastal plantation 
owners, much as their fathers and grandfathers had done during the previous 
famines of Chingo (1857-1862), and Maere (1836-1838) .15 Many of the freed 
slaves living on Church Missionary Society (CMS) land in Rabai migrated north 
to Fulladayo, near the Sabaki River, to live with other runaways because there 
was still maize growing there .16 Indeed, migration from a drought-striken 
area to a place where food was still growing was one of the most common 
responses to famine. 
One particular group of farmers who coped surprisingly well during 
Mwakisenge famine were the ARavai coconut palm cultivators of Rabai and Ruruma 
locations. Rabai especially h.;:;i been a food-importing and palm wine-exporting 
area since the mid-19th century, and one might expect that people who depended 
upon regular food imports would suffer the most during famine.17 However, 
coconut palm trees do not require certain amounts of rain at specific 
intervals in order to bear fruit; the palm tree will continue to yield coconut 
fruits or palm wine at least three or four times a year after the rains have 
fallen. Hence, during Mwakisenge as well as subsequent famines, ARavai coconut 
palm owners survived by eating their own coconuts and by selling palm wine for 
food. Indeed, the famine relief provided by the coconut tree prompted many 
other Mijikenda peoples to migrate to Rabai, Ruruma and other palm growing 
areas near the coast in order to share in the harvest of coconuts and palm 
wine. And by 1886 long caravans of Akamba traders were observed coming to 
Rabai, carrying many gourds full of maize to exchange for palm wine.18 When 
asked why farmers would continue to trade scarce foodstuffs and livestock, 
such as chickens or goats, for an alcoholic beverage, such as palm wine, 
during a severe famine, the ARavai remark that people who want to drink will 
not stop drinking just because of famine: "Do you not know that we have 
something desirable here, something people want all the time? How can you stop 
them from drinking palm wine when it is like a food to them? 1119 
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Mkufu 
In 1889 drought again struck the hinterland, causing a famine known as 
Mkufu. The famine endured for one year, until the resumption of normal rains 
in 1891. The Mijikenda designate this famine as Mkufu because at that time one 
method by which people survived was to trade their own jewelry (mkufu/mikufu, 
KiSwahili, or mlia/milia, Mijikenda vernacular), as well as necklaces, 
bracelets and other ornaments that they manufactured either to AKamba herders 
or Asian shopkeepers for food.20 Although this famine did not persist as 
long as Mwakisenge, it was a harsh famine that prompted some AGiriama families 
to capture and sell slaves, or to pawn their own dependents in exchange for 
food at the coast. 21 Just as the Mkufu famine was. drawing to an end, a 
rinderpest epidemic infected the cattle of Mijikenda and AKamba stock herders, 
further reducing their wealth.22 
Sometimes during famines local conflicts would erupt within communities, 
with certain elements being singled out as the cause of the crisis. During the 
Mkufu famine such a phenomenon occured in Ribe where the local elders blamed 
the Methodist missionaries for detaining the rain by their charms. When a 
local rainfinder went on a search and suggested that the rain had been hidden 
inside the Christian mission at Ribe, the ARihe became quite agitated and 
threatened to drive the European missionaries and their followers out of 
Ribe. Only the. onset of rain saved the Methodists from possible harm, and 
even then the start of rains in 1891 convinced many people that the Christians 
indeed had detained the rain and were only releasing it because they had been 
implicated by the ARihe rainfinder.23 
Bom-Bom 
Another drought afflicted the Mijikenda in 1894, and before the next 
planting could be harvested in 1895 locusts attacked coastal farms, destroying 
many crops. This drought and subsequent food shortage coincided with 
intermittent warfare in the coastal region. In June and November of 1895 
rebels sympathetic to the Mazrui leader Mbaruk bin Rashid attacked Rabai, 
burning 53 homes, killing 6 people and wounding 7 others, while destroying 
several farms, including many coconut palm groves, before being driven 
away.24 Because of the fighting throughout Mijikenda territory during 1895, 
this famine was called Bom-Bom, after the sound of gunfire. Yet even though 
the drought, famine and pestilence brought a food crisis to the area, people 
living in Rabai, Ruruma and other locales report that this famine was not as 
severe as the previous two, and that most people survived by trade or 
migration to more peaceful and prosperous places.25 
Magunia 
The worst famine to occur in the coastal region, as well as many other 
.Parts of East Africa, began in 1898 after a severe drought. For almost two 
years there were almost no grain or vegetable harvests in many parts of Kenya 
because of the negligible rainfall. Indeed, water became so precious that some 
Mijikenda elders placed waterholes under the protection of powerful oaths that 
would kill anyone who attempted to draw water from the designated 
reservoirs.26 Contemporary observers estimated that this famine affected 
more than 2,000,000 people throughout East Africa; and accompanied as it was 
by a smallpox epidemic, dysentry, and a plague of jiggers, the famine led to 
the deaths of more than 40,000 people. Among the victims were a few Europeans, 
including the Methodist missionary Thomas H. Carthew of Ribe.27 
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This famine is known to the Mijikenda as the Magunia famine because the 
grain, primarily rice, that was imported to feed the starving people, came 
from India in gunny sacks (gunia/magunia, KiSwahili). 28 Famine relief camps 
were established in Mombasa and both the colonial British government and 
missio~ societies organized public works projects by which able-bodied 
individuals could receive a ration of food and seed in return for labor. 29 
However, most Mijikenda who migrated in search of food either settled among 
more fortunate Mijikenda farmers in the palm tree belt or became the clients 
of Muslim landowners. Arab and Swahili plantation owners were losing slave 
labor at that time and they were only too happy to give hungry innnigrants 
access to food and land in return for labor on their estates. This tradition 
of interdependency between coastal landowners and destitute families from the 
hinterland had existed at least since 1836, and it continued to endure 
throughout the colonial era as well. However, the influx of squatters onto 
coastal estates increased to such a degree during the 20th century that it led 
to conflicts over land ownership between plantation owners and squatters, who 
had maintained and even improved neglected parcels of land throughout the 
coast. These conflicts caused the colonial government to regard the widespread 
presence of squatters as an impediment to the economic development of the 
coastal region, and they attempted to discourage squatting, eliminating one 
form of famine relief that many Mijikenda peoples had come to depend upon.30 
Within the hinterland some people survived the Magunia famine by helping 
Asian merchants transport the imported grain to their shops. In Mombasa sacks 
of grain were loaded onto small boats and brought up the creeks to local 
landing stations near Rabai and Ribe. Asian traders then offered people work 
carrying the heavy magunia from the creeks, to their stores in Mazeras, Rabai, 
Ruruma, Ribe and Kambe. In return for a day's labor a porter received a ration 
of about 2 kilograms of rice, maize or millet. However, that was not always 
adequate to feed one man's family and consequently some porters cut open their 
sacks, buried some of the grain in the forest, proceeded with the sack to the 
store, and then returned at night to retrieve what they .had buried. But even 
this did not help everyone. Some porters were already so weak from hunger or 
disease that even the task of carrying the maguni was too much stress for them 
and they died while working. A few hills in Rabai are named in connnemoration 
of some of these men, such as Bendeje and Gumo. Many other people died from 
disease, especially .smallpox and plague, during this famine. Eyewitnesses 
maintain that the fear of infection was so great that even those people who 
were very weak and ill but not quite dead yet were buried by the 
Administrative Police in order to prevent the spread of disease.31 
Although Magunia was a very severe food crisis for many people throughout 
East Africa, some individuals maintained themselves without undue hardship, 
while a few actually benefitted by the dislocation in the Mombasa hinterland. 
During the drought prominent coconut palm tree owners could hire enough 
destitute tappers that they actually increased their sales of palm wine, 
securing enough revenue and food in return to feed their own families, pay 
their workers, and still have food or money left to invest in cattle ownership 
or coconut tree mortgages. Palm owners with farms along the creek and river 
beds where moisture was still available were the most fortunate in this 
respect. Much of the palm wine tapped in Rabai and Ruruma was sold near the 
coast because grain was available there. So much palm wine was sold near 
Kisauni, the CMS station (Freretown) opposite Mombasa, that Magunia famine is 
also known as the famine Kisauni among the ARa~ai.32 Indeed, the vitality of 
the coconut palm economy not only attracted many hungry ADuruma, AGiriama and 
AKamba people to Rabai seeking temporary sustenance from the coconut tree 
during the famine, after the famine it prompted them to return to their own 
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homes with coconut seedlings in the hope that they themselves could harvest 
and sell palm wine or coconuts during time of normal rainfall and enjoy some 
protection from hunger during time of abnormally dry seasons.33 
During the late 19th century the Mijikenda were continuing to expand 
territorially throughout the Kenya hinterland. AGiriama families were the most 
prominent migratory settlers, as they moved northward from Mariakani, past 
Kaloleni, towards the Sabaki River Valley. The territorial expansion of the 
Mijikenda was caused not only by modest population growth, but by a search for 
better environments away from the scourge of· drought and famine. By 1900 the 
Mijikenda occupied a unique geographical position astride variable ecological 
zones suitable for hunting, grazing, intensive grain and vegetable farming, 
and fruit tree cultivation, Together with their history of socio-economic 
interaction among themselves, as well as with neighboring peoples, this access 
to several environments ensured that even during the most severe ecological 
disaster, anyone who was able and willing to move or to sell something, 
including their own labor, could find kindred help or alternative sources of 
food that would enable them to survive.34 This fact, more than any thing 
else, meant that the Mijikenda could expect to survive famine during the 20th 
century much better than they had the foo'd crises of the 19th century, and 
that most deaths would be from disease and not starvation. 
Surviving Famines During the 20th Century 
There are famines, real famines, and then there are small 
famines. And during these famines, really severe famines 
you may not eat. But during the other famines, if your 
farming fails and you do not harvest any food, there is 
food there at the store. And you will use your pocket 
money to buy that food.35 
There is no doubt that in some areas of East Africa the British did 
augment the ability of some people to survive the food crises of the 20th 
century. For example, J. Forbes Munro argues that between 1910 and 1940 "the 
development of rail and road transport and the growth of the marketing system" 
helped to improve "food supply and nutritional standards" especially in 
''marginal areas" of Ukambani. Munro points out that "al though there were some 
years of scanty rainfall, food could now be imported into Ukambani in bulk, to 
be distributed through a network of retai 1 shops," and so even though droughts 
caused deprivation for many people, death from starvation became more rare 
than it was during the 19th century. Ukambani also experienced ''better than 
average rainfall from 1914 through the 1940s," enabling farmers to produce 
good harvests between droughts. Consequently, because of these political, 
economic and ecological factors, the ability of AKamba families to survive 
food crises improved between 1900 and 1914.36 
These factors certainly were not as important to the Mij ikenda who had 
long been a part of a widespread network of exchange that incorporated 
hunters, herders and farmers into one regional economy. Their proximity to the 
coast and ports such as Mombasa, Kilifi and Malindi ensured that the Mijikenda 
could both export and import the commodities they needed, whether foodstuffs, 
hardware or consumer goods. Because they were so close to Mombasa the 
construction of the railroad through their ter.ritory had a neglilgible impact 
on their access to extraordinary food supplies. The building of roads 
facilitated the exchange of goods, enhancing existing trading relationships, 
but it was not until after the 1950s when regular lorry service was 
inaugurated that road transport displaced Mijikenda use of creeks and 
footpaths that connected the hinterland and the coast. 
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Indeed, certain aspects of British colonial rule had a deleterious impact 
on the ability of food-importing people, such as the ARavai, to overcome 
drought and famine. Aside from the rather wel 1 documented British 
discrimination in favor of white settler agriculture over African farming, and 
official preoccupation with the upcountry to the detriment of the coast, there 
were particular government policies that had a negative effect on coastal 
agriculture and food crises prevention. Along the coast itself agriculture 
ossified when the colonial government refused to recognize the rights of 
squatters to land which they had kept productive in spite of landowner 
disinterest, while Swahili and Arab landowners were reluctant to invest in 
estates over which they did not have more control, especially control over the 
squatters.37 What was most noxious to the Mijikenda though were British 
regulations designed to inhibit the production and marketing of palm wine, 
while promoting the harvesting and sale of coconuts and copra. By limiting the 
amount of palm wine that could be legally transported from palm wine producing 
locales such as Rabai, the British prevented ARavai palm wine merchants and 
palm cultivators from accumulating the grain reser-;;.es necessary to feed their 
families, especially during times of drought or food shortages. And by 
encouraging the production of cash crops such as copra, cotton, and cashew 
nuts, the colonial regime was making Mijikenda farmers even more susceptible 
to food crises. For if farmers stopped selling palm wine, a product virtually 
always in great local demand, and harvested coconuts instead, and then turned 
over their small maize plots to cotton, rubber or cashew nut farming, and the 
price of any of these goods dropped at the time of famine, not only would 
these people not have enough food to feed themselves (with the notable 
exception of coconuts or cashew nuts), they would not receive enough money 
from the sale of their cash crops to buy the food necessary to sustain their 
families.38 
Finally, unlike Ukambani, Mijikenda territory between Rabai and Kilifi did 
not enjoy better than average rainfall during the colonial era. From 1899 
through 1961 there were 34 below average years, "dry years, 11 of rainfall and 
29 above average years, ''wet years, 11 of rainfal 1. The wettest years were 
between 1900 and 1909, and 1932 through 1941; while there were three decades 
of unusually dry weather, from 1910 to 1919, 1920 through 1931, and from 1942 
until 1950. The preponderance of dry years was an ecological impediment to the 
successful development of Mijikenda agriculture. Combined with the political 
and economic constraints imposed upon the Mijikenda, drought created several 
rather severe food crises for these people during the colonial era. 
TABLE 1: 
KENYA COAST ANNUAL RAINFALL STATISTICS, ca.1875-1980 
Year Inches 














































































































































































































Mean Annual Rainfall: 49.57 inches 
26.89 
35,89 
Average Annual Rainfall: 42.31 inches 
*Highest rainfall recorded in years under consideration 
**Lowest rainfall recorded in years under consideration 













Source: 1875-1880 statistics from William W.A. Fitzgerald, Travels 
in the Coastlands of British East Africa and the Islands of Zanaibar 
and Pemba (London, 1898), 8. 1899-1980 statistics from the Annual 
Reports for Mombasa District, Rabai District and Kilifi District, 




The first food crisis to afflict the Mijikenda during the 20th century was 
a minor famine centered around Mariakani and Kambe locations that became known 
by two names, Memarongwe, and Madzungu or Marenje. Between 1910 and 1912 below 
average and erratic rainfall prevented cereal farmers from harvesting a 
significant crop. Consequently many people had to forage for food, One of the 
indigeneous plants eaten in order to curb hunger was the gourd or squash plant 
known as madzungu or marenje (Mijikenda vernacular) ,39 This famine was also 
named after a woman, Memarongwe, who had a market in her village near Rabai :_ 
where tappers came to sell palm wine and buy food, Memarongwe sold cassava 
during this drought, but even she died because she was unable to procure 
enough food after she had exhausted her own resources,40 
Despite local famine conditions, ARavai palm tappers continued to collect 
palm wine which they sold to grain farmers from territory west of Mariakani, 
Many palm wine tappers congregated in Mazeras during Memarongwe famine because 
of the number of retail stores where food was available. Although many 
Mijikenda grain farmers were willing to sell scarce supplies of maize for palm 
wine, they drastically reduced the amount of cereals that they exported to 
towns such as Malindi and Mombasa, which evoked considerable complaint from 
town dwellers and local administrators, Indeed, one official remarked that 
many AGiriama ''would continue to sell their grain for palm wine until they 
were on the verge of famine, 11 but would not bring any to town for sale.41 
During this famine, as they had done in the past, some AGiriama and ADuruma 
families migrated to Rabai and Jomvu in order t.o work for farmers who could 
feed them, Most Mijikenda preferred to go to work for their neighbors rather 
than seek employment from European planters along the coast, and this dismayed 
the colonial regime as well,42 
Faini 
The first severe famine to strike the Mijikenda during the 20th century 
was caused in part by direct British interference in the expansion of 
Mijikenda agriculture, In 1914 and 1915 the AGiriama rebelled against the 
British government because of demands for labor for coastal plantations, 
public works projects, and government military forces. The British suppressed 
the revolt, forced the AGiriama to pay a fine of Rs, 100,000/- (£10,000), and 
forced them to evacuate the rich farming lands they were cultivating north of 
the Sabaki River Valley. The dislocation caused by the fighting prevented many 
people from cultivating their fields, so despite an above average rainfall in 
1914 and 1915 few crops were harvested by the AGiriama. In order to pay the 
fine levied by the government, the AGiriama had to sell their livestock and 
use up their cash reserves, while also borrowing heavily from Asian merchants 
and wealthy Mijikenda neighbors, promising repayment after the harvest of 
1916, But with the Sabaki River granary closed to Mijikenda farmers, prospects 
for future harvests were not very good, When the AGiriama were still unable to 
pay the entire amount of the fine after 1915, the colonial administration 
confiscated their remaining livestock and forced more than 1000 young men to 
go to work as porters in the British East Africa Army,43 
Drought came to the hinterland in late 1915, and it endured until 1920, 
causing widespread famine among the Mijikenda. In 1917 locusts attacked the 
few crops farmers were trying to cultivate under the dry conditions prevailing 
at that time, Further dislocation was caused by an influenza epidemic that 
weakened or killed hundreds of Mijikenda people, and many other Africans 
throughout East Africa during 1918 and 1919. Because this famine started at 
the same time that the British were collecting the fine from the AGiriama, the 
famine of 1916-1919 became known as Nzala ya Faini (the famine of the fine, 
Mijikenda vernacular).44 
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According to both British and Mij ikenda testimony, Nzala ya Faini was 
every bit as severe as Nzala ya Magunia had been.45 Cattle, goats, and 
coconut trees had been the primary source of relief among the Mijikenda during 
previous famines. But the wholesale confiscation of their livestock meant that 
AGiriama families had nothing left to sell in order to purchase food. 
Furthermore, many coconut trees suffered because of the long-term drought, and 
by 1918 hundreds of palm, orange, mango, and other fruit trees were moribund 
throughout the coastal region. Although the colonial government imported large 
quantities of millet and maize, primarily from South Africa, to feed famine 
victims, no one received any rations unless they paid cash or worked on a 
government project.46 
Those Mijikenda who survived Nzala ya Faini relied on several strategies 
to procure food. Many AGiriama were forced to migrate in search of work and 
food; some of them went west to hunt with their Waata (Laa/Ariangulo) 
neighbors, a few lived on the edible roots available in the country, while 
others went to work for friends or relatives in exchange for food.47 Rabai 
was one place where many AGiriama congregated because of the opportunity to 
work for coconut palm owners, and because it was one of the few trading 
centers allowed to operate by the military authorities between 1916 and 
1918.48 However the influx of so many hungry people into Rabai and coastal 
estates put an additional strain on already scant resources that often 
culminated in riots over access to scarce food supplies.49 
The ARavai maintain that although some of their older and weaker palms 
died because of the drought, they themselves were not as severely affected by 
the famine as their AGiriama neighbors. It was difficult to procure food, and 
when available it was quite expensive; nevertheless by selling palm wine for 
cash, or trading it for what maize was brought in by the ADuruma, most ARavai 
families survived the famine. The ARavai also were able to purchase some -of 
the livestock confiscated by the British from the AGiriama. Rabai was the 
local administrative headquarters for the colonial authorities, and when the 
British brought the cattle and goats seized from the AGiriama into Rabai, they 
were bought by ARavai families. Goats could be purchased for Rs. 3/-, and 
cattle for Rs. 20/-;-50 
The one strategy few Mijikenda people pursued in order to get food was to 
go to work for the British, either the government or private plantation 
owners. The Mijikenda preferred to work among their own kin or neighboring 
peoples because their work habits and customs were more compatible with one 
another. Even Muslim plantation owners along the coast were considered by the 
Mijikenda to be more tolerant employers than the Europeans. Muslims allowed 
their Mijikenda workers to take religious holidays off, and to observe a less 
rigid schedule than European· employers did. Furthermore Muslim estate owners 
allowed their Mijikenda employees to tap some of their coconut palms for palm 
wine, both for their own consumption and for sale in town, splitting the 
profits with the tree owner, while British plantation owners adamantly refused 
to allow their coconut trees to be used in this way. Muslim and Mij ikenda 
landowners also were willing to accept open-ended arrangements with immigrants 
seeking work and food, thereby permitting workers to return to their own farms 
at short notice, with little risk of losing their wages or missing the 
planting season back in their own home area. Mijikenda resistance to European 
demands was a source of constant irritation to the British, and their 
unwillingness to come out to work for European planters or the government was 
even taken by the British as a sign that the Mijikenda were not experiencing 
severe famine, an assessment that would be made time after time during foo.d 
crises throughout the colonial era.51 
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Dzua Bomu 
The Mijikenda began to recover from Faini famine during 1919. However, 
after one wet year a record dry year ensued; in 1921 only 9.54 inches of rain 
fell in Rabai, and other areas throughout the hinterland experienced similar 
drought. Indeed, the British reported it was the most severe in the living 
memory of most Mijikenda elders. The Mijikenda themselves refer to this as the 
famine of Dzua Bomu ( the fierce sun, Mij ikenda vernacular). Virtually al 1 
grain and vegetable crops dried up in their fields and even coconut trees 
withered and died from the lack of rainfall. Livestock died because there was 
little pasture and water for them, too. The ability of the British to provide 
effective famine relief was severely hampered because in 1921, after ruling 
the Mijikenda from Rabai station for 25 years, the government decided to move 
its district headquarters to Kilifi, a more salubrious environment for 
European officials, and a more central point for a district that extended from 
Mombasa in the south to Malindi in the north.52 
After so many years of drought the British decided that the best form of 
immediate famine relief would be to embark on a program of water-supply. 
During 1921 and 1922 the government forcibly recruited Mijikenda laborers to 
work building dams along the creeks and rivers in Mariakani and Rabai. This 
achieved two results: needy families received an immediate ration of food in 
return for their work, and the dams helped to conserve water, so that when 
drought struck again, there would be more water for local residents. 53 When 
Dzua Bomu was followed by near-record rains in 1922, known locally as Mvula 
Bomu (the great rains, Mijikenda vernacular), British planning proved superb. 
However, as these dams filled with water, they became ideal breeding grounds 
for mosquitoes, thereby increasing the incidence of malaria among the 
Mijikenda. Still, this was a small price to pay in the eyes of the British; a 
few administrators remarked that, "I would rather be sick for a while with 
malaria than risk dying of thirst or have my crops wither · and cattle die 
because there was no water. 1154 
Although there was drought and food was scarce, even some Mijikenda state 
that Dzua Bomu was not a really severe famine because very few people died of 
hunger. The drought compelled AKamba and AGiriama cattle herders to evacuate 
the drier pastures around Mariakani and Gotani, and they brought their herds 
eastward, towards Rabai, seeking water. But even the rivers in Rabai were so 
dry that eyewitnesses maintain that the crocodiles living in the area died and 
never returned after this severe drought. With no water and virtually no 
pasture, herders were forced to slaughter many of their cattle and goats 
before they died, so that they could sell their hides and meat for money to 
buy grain. 55 Local tappers could still get palm wine from the more sturdy 
coconut trees, but even those palms dried out after a few months. This 
prompted many ARavai, ARihe, and AGiriama tappers to go in search of the more 
drought-resistant;- but lower-yielding, mkoma/mikoma (Kiswahili) palm tree 
(hyphaene or doin palm), which could be tapped for palm wine, too. There were 
few foods available within the hinterland though: only cassava and some maize. 
The primary local diet of the Mijikenda during Dzua Bomu, for those families 
·unable to purchase food, consisted of palm wine, cassava and mangoes, eaten 
alone or in combination. Al though few people reportedly died of hunger, this 
was not a very nutritious diet. The adverse effect of poor nutrition, 
especially for the years froin 1916 through 1922, cannot easily be calculated. 
Children must have suffered the worst; and the endemic presence of bilharzia, 
bookwork, and malaria, combined with the poor diet of famine years, must have 
adversely affected the growth and development of Mijikenda children at that 
time.56 
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The drought Dzua Bomu was the cause of some controversy within Rabai, much 
as the drought of Mkufu had been in Ribe. In 1921 Rabai was a community 
divided between two elements, the western-educated, largely Christian 
community that disdained traditional customs of the Mijikenda, and the more 
conservative elements led by the kaya elders who supported the maintenance of 
ARavai rituals. When drought came, both sides accused the other of witchcraft, 
of trying to forestall the rains in order to ruin the fortunes of the others. 
Feelings ran especially high among the non-educated palm tappers because they 
were so much more dependent upon their farms for their sustenance and income 
than were those educated people who held jobs in the civil service or who 
worked for companies operating in towns such as Mombasa. In 1922 ARavai 
coconut palm tappers summoned a renowned mganga (traditional herbalist, 
KiSwahili), to search for the rain they were convinced had been bewitched by 
elements in the Christian community, According to popular ARavai tradition it 
was through the successful search of Joha Bejoha and his assistants that rain 
finally came to Rabai and Ruruma, and as a result the rains of 1922 are also 
remembered as Mvula ya Joha (the rains of Joha).57 
The Mijikenda endured much agricultural hardship during the 1920s. In 1924 
a flock of birds came in inordinate numbers, destroying the millet crops 
around Mazeras, Gotani and Rabai. Drought occured again during 1927 and 1928, 
reducing harvests. Swarms of locusts wrecked more destruction around farms 
near Mariakani in 1928, creating a minor food crisis during 1929. A second 
wave of locust attacks in 1929 further aggravated the food shortage. Poor 
rains fell in 1930 and harvests did not improve until 1931 and 1932. During 
this time the colonial government was proceeding with its program of 
dam-building. Local officials also encouraged the Mijikenda to plant more 
drought-resistant crops, such as cassava, sorghum, and millet, but the 
Mijikenda did not heed this advice. Maize had usurped most other cereals in 
Mijikenda diets by the early 20th century. Millet was considered too 
troublesome to cultivate by many farmers, because they had to be on constant 
watch to protect their plants against birds, and neither millet nor sorghum 
yielded as much per acre as maize did during adequate rainfall. Many Mijikenda 
farmers continued to keep a few cassava plants in their gardens to guard 
against drought and famine, but very few families continued to cultivate 
millet or sorghum after the 1920s, Most farmers hoped that .because they could 
plant and harvest two maize crops per annum, as opposed to only one annual 
crop of millet or sorghum, that even if they lost one planting of maize to 
drought, they could recover with their second annual planting of maize.SB 
Nzije 
Although the amount of rainfall increased during the 1930s, it was 
sporadic and, in some cases, just as damaging to crops as drought could be. 
For example, 19 34 was a wet year but there was virtually no rain for three 
months, and then when the rains commenced, they came with such tremendous 
force and unabated intensity that many crops perished, Farmers undertook 
second and even third plantings, but their efforts went for naught when a 
swarm of locusts invaded the hinterland later that same year. This was the 
most widespread, destructive plague of locusts experienced by the Mijikenda 
during the colonial era, surpassing the destruction caused in 1928 or 1929. 
According to local testimony, these locusts ate everything in sight: crops in 
the field, pasture grasses, the fresh palm leaves on coconut trees, and even 
the dried palm thatching used to build homes. The government recruited. many 
Mijikenda to work exterminating the locusts and their larvae. As a result, 
this famine was intimately associated with locusts and so it became known as 
Nzala ya Nzije (the -famine of locusts).59 
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The Nzije famine endured from 1934 through 1935 and ended only when the 
locusts left the hinterland. This famine was made worse by an outbreak of 
smallpox in 1935, and the prevalence of other diseases, notably 
trypanosomiasis and malaria. During the famine the British embarked on 
extensive famine relief projects; during 1934 more. than 2000 Mijikenda men 
were employed building roads between Rabai, Kaloleni and Mariakani, for which 
they received a ration of food. For those farmers who could not tap their palm 
trees because the buds were eaten by locusts, or for grain farmers who lost 
their crops, this government work did provide some famine relief.60 However, 
most tappers migrated to other parts of the palm belt that were less affected 
by the locusts, particularly farms near Mombasa. 61 Some palm trees in the 
hinterland survived the locust plague, and the owners of those trees remained 
in Rabai or Ruruma selling wine for grain or cash.62 Many Mijikenda families 
also migrated north to Chonyi territory, southwest of Kilifi, to work as 
temporary laborers cultivating rice, c.assava and maize for a share of the 
harvest. In this way Mijikenda families avoided the need to rely on official 
famine relief while strengthening the bonds of communality among 
themselves.63 
The Mijikenda enjoyed one decade of relative prosperity following the end 
of Nzije famine. Only in 1939, when a drought reduced harvests and a heavy 
rain washed out much of a subsequent planting, did farmers experience any 
difficulty. But the strong rains at the end of 1939 endured through early 
1940, doing damage not only to crops but washing out roads, dams and 
communication networks throughout the hinterland. Fearing a severe famine, the 
government banned the export of millet and maize in order to keep food within 
the district. Yet often times farmers had to sell their crops in order to meet 
the financial demands of the colonial state, especially annual tax payments. 
Indeed, one official remarked that the tendency of Mij ikenda farmers to sel 1 
much of their harvest to get the money to pay tax or meet other expenses, 
meant that families were more vulnerable to starvation if even a slight 
drought and famine took place.64 
Ngano 
Another sev.ere famine began in the hinterland during 1943 and endured 
until 1945. A failure of rains lasted from 1942 through 1943, creating drought 
conditions and a food shortage. Late in 1943 the situation was complicated by 
the arrival of locusts in grain producing areas near Mariakani, and the 
pastures near Gotani. Rainfall, though moderate in 1944 and 1945 was untimely 
and therefore not of much help to farmers cultivating their fields. Local 
harvests did not provide any relief until late 1945 and early 1946. Because 
there was little prospec.t of local relief, the government imported tremendous 
amounts of food. In July 1943 alone, 1500 bags (72,000 kg) of cassava flour 
were distributed in Kilifi District, and in December 2500 bags (120,000 kg) of 
maize flour were given to needy families. During 1944 more than 32,640 bags 
(1,566,816 kg) of whole wheat were distributed to the Mijikenda residents of 
Kilifi District. Because imported wheat was the primary food eaten by 
Mijikenda families during this food crisis, the famine of 1943-1945 became 
known as Nzala ya Ngano (the famine of wheat).65 
The Mijikenda endured Ngano famine largely because of the efforts of the 
British government, and this is one time when Wrigley's assessment of the 
contribution of the British to alleviate deaths from catastrophe seems well 
deserved. The government distributed the wheat flour to the Chiefs in all 
locations, making the Chiefs responsible for rationing out portions of food to 
local families, with between 1 and 2 kilograms going to each man, woman and 
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child every week. Some Chiefs preferred not to handle the distribution 
themselves, and they made local store owners responsible for storing and 
passing out the flour, but only according to coupons issued by the Chief to 
needy families. By having the Chiefs administer the famine relief program, the 
British ensured that only those l-0cal families who were truly needy would 
receive the food. Indeed, several wealthy farmers who were known to have 
sizeable maize storage bins full from previous harvests, were denied an 
allocation of wheat flour by their Chiefs.66 
Although the British generously distributed much wheat flour, they did 
extract much forced labor from the Mij ikenda in return. For example, during 
1943 more than 2340 laborers were recruited in Kilifi District and sent to 
work on European sisal, rubber and cashew nut estates. Other laborers were 
conscripted for roadwork and the building of water pipelines. 6 7 Consequently 
many Mij ikenda preferred not to rely on government supplied wheat lest they 
become subject to official labor demands. These young men went to work on 
their own farms, tapping palms for wine, or they migrated to plantations near 
Mombasa and even as far south as Tanga, Tanganyika, to escape conscription and 
earn the money necessary to buy food to feed their families. 68 
Kabus huts ii 
Within just a few years after the end of Ngano famine, the Mijikenda were 
victims of one of the most severe famines of the 20th century. The failure of 
rain in late 1947 reduced harvests at that time and when the early rains of 
1948 proved inadequate as well, a food crisis began. The government had to 
import more than 32,500 bags (1,561,440 kg) of maize meal in 1948 to feed the 
hungry residents of Kilifi District. The continual lack of rain and poor 
harvests in 1949 necessitated the importation of 36,407 bags (1,747,536 kg) of 
maize meal that year, as well as 4860 bags (233,280 kg) of cassava. When the 
drought endured through 1950 many Mijikenda were still lacking food, prompting 
the government to bring in more than 64,650 bags (3,103,900 kg) of maize meal, 
and an additional 10,160 bags (487,680 kg) of maize into Kilifi District. 
Finally in 1951 the drought broke and a wet year ensued with adequate 
harvests. Even though local food production increased in late 1951, it was not 
enough to completely alleviate the residual hunger in the area, and so the 
British imported almost 69,000 bags (3,312,000 kg) of maizemeal during the 
year. Drought returned in 1952 necessitating the importation of 22,464 bags 
(1,078,272 kg) of maize meal for famine relief. Again, 1953 was a wet year but 
1954 was a near record dry year and there was no adequate rainfall until 
almost 1957. Although this famine was punctuated by a few years of good 
harvests, the time from 1948 through 1954 is remembered as one of the most 
difficult in recent memory.69 
The famine of 1948-19 54 has several local names, al 1 indicative of the 
serious nature of this food crisis. Around Mazeras, Rabai, and Ruruma the 
famine was known as Kabushutsii, a word which means to avert one's eyes from 
another person by gazing down at the ground. The ARa~ai maintain that this 
food shortage was so severe that no one would want to look at anyone else 
while eating food lest they notice that other person's hunger and be forced to 
invite them to come share what little food one had. 70 Other eyewitnesses 
report that this famine was so stressful even family members refused to 
cooperate. Instead, each person kept his or her own food without sharing it 
with one's wife, husband, son, daughter, or parent. This led people to call 
the famine Ndulgu Si Mtu, which means that a relative is no one, •~rothers are 
not brothers, 11 that even bonds of kinship were unimportant when compared to 
one's own personal hunger. 71 During this famine there was such a severe 
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shortage of grain that few families had any cereals to eat, except what they 
could buy from shops stocking imported food. Consequently many Mijikenda 
families survived by eating coconuts. Some people were so hungry that they did 
not wait for the coconuts to fully ripen, instead they ate unripe coconuts 
causing some people to refer to this as the famine of Makaroma (unripe 
coconut, Mijikenda vernacular).72 
The Mijikenda survived this famine much as they had endured others 
mentioned above. Some families continued to sell palm wine around Rabai and 
Ruruma, while other tappers migrated to work along the coast. ADuruma and 
AGiriama herders brought their livestock to Rabai for sale and there they 
purchased grain and palm wine. Some families living between Rabai and Ribe 
subsisted on wild spinach, mtsunga that grew along the creeks and rivers in 
the area, while other families ate cassava and yams they had planted in 
anticipation of such famine. During the famine many Mijikenda famil-ies 
continued to plant cassava.73 
For those people with nothing to eat and nothing to trade for food, except 
their own labor, government relief was most welcome. During Kabushutsii famine 
the British imported a total of some 240,000 bags (11,524,000 kg) of cereals 
to help feed the residents of Kilifi District. Much of this food was sold 
through local shops in the hinterland, but a significant amount was also given 
to those people who worked, forcibly or voluntarily, on public works projects. 
Kabushutsii was such a severe famine that even women and children came out to 
work on road building, dam building and bore-hole digging. One official 
reported that had there been no government assistance, "there would have been 
many deaths from starvation, whereas in fact there were none reported. 1174 
Conclusion 
Famines, famines are the way of the world. There is a time 
of famine, and then there is a time of plenty when there 
is no hunger. There are famines in this world. Famines 
will never leave us.75 
By the end of the colonial era the British themselves recognized that 
although they had done much to provide emergency famine relief, the Mijikenda 
peoples themselves were quite resourceful in coping with drought and food 
crises. One officer noted that within Kilifi District, "it is extremely 
difficult for people actually to starve, owing to the prevalence of tree 
crops, in particular the coconut tree, which can be relied upon to provide 
excellent if rather restricted nourishment. 1176 Before ca. 1880 coconut palm 
cultivation was confined to the coast itself, parts of Digo land (Kwale 
District) southwest of Mombasa,· and the area around Rabai and Ribe. But 
beginning in the late 19th century the coconut tree spread rapidly throughout 
the coastal hinterland, until by the 1930s virtually all Mijikenda peoples 
were growing some palms. The rather rapid adoption of coconut tree farming 
attests to its importance both as a potential source of income, from the sale 
of wine and coconuts, and as a source of food, especially in time of famine. 
By planting coconut palms Mijikenda grain farmers ensured that even if their 
cereal crops failed because of drought, the more resilient palm tree would 
yield minimum sustenance during a food shortage. 
The ability of the Mij ikenda to survive famine improved during the 20th 
century because of their initiative in planting tree crops, especially the 
coconut palm. Mijikenda opportunities to migrate in search of land and 
employment in areas unaffected by drought also increased, enhancing their 
ability to overcome hunger or starvation. Because of their proximity to the 
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Indian Ocean ports of Mombasa and Malindi the Mijikenda enjoyed relatively 
quick access to imported food during times of crises, whether during the 19th 
or 20th centuries. Under British colonial rule this access to international 
food supplies, as well as access to domestic food supplies, increased, 
improving Mijikenda ability to secure food and withstand shortages. Combined 
with official campaigns launched to provide smallpox innoculations, to 
encourage the digging of pit latrines, and provide some basic health services, 
this influx of food supplies helped to alleviate hunger and reduce death from 
starvation and disease. Undoubtedly many food problems lingered even at the 
end of the colonial era, such as malnourishment, but by 1963 the ability of 
most Mijikenda to survive famine had improved, at least in part because of 
British assistance. 
Structurally however, the British had done little to eliminate some of the 
causes of famine; most of their efforts were directed toward providing 
temporary relief, not permanent change. Indeed, it can be argued that some 
colonial policies actually impeded the ability of farmers to cope with drought 
and famine on their own, making them more dependent on official assistance 
than they might have been in the past. A few British officials even admitted 
that colonial agricultural policies were not well suited to African farming in 
Kenya. By emphasizing the production of cash crops instead of foodstuffs, and 
devoting its attention only to the most productive areas of the colony, the 
government neglected basic food production and farming in the more marginal 
areas of Kenya such as the coast.77 A few sympathetic administrators pointed 
out that many African farmers, such as the Mijikenda, had not received 
adequate services, including agricultural assistance, in return for the amount 
of taxation and labor they gave the government. As early as 1923 the senior 
officer at the coast pointed out that "the Native Public provides the greatest 
part of this Colony's revenue but hitherto they have received very little in 
return. "78 In 1943 another official criticized government policies that 
concentrated too much on European plantations along the coast to the detriment 
of farming and stock-raising in places such as Rabai, Mariakani and 
Kaloleni.79 While the British did encourage the planting of more cassava and 
millet to guard against future drought or famine, they also promoted the 
production of cotton, rubber, sisal, copra and cashew nuts, cash crops which 
would not feed farmers' families if world prices were low, or if drought 
adversely affected local production. Finally, by taking control of the trade 
of grains, such as maize, through government parstatal organizations, such as 
the Maize Marketing Board, the government inhibited the local exchange of 
foodstuffs that had provided much relief during some famines of the late 19th 
and early 20th century. Indeed, the· central control exercised over the 
purchase and sale of cereals may have contributed to the severity of recent 
famines, forcing the government to provide more famine relief than may have 
been necessary if local food supplies and local networks of exchange were 
allowed to operate intact. 
Makusudi 
The result of poor official planning can be seen in the most recent food 
crisis to occur in Kenya. Poor rainfall in late 1979 reduced yields along the 
coast and in many other farming areas of Kenya, and by the beginning of 1980 
there was a shortage of food. But, after record harvests in 1977 and 1978 
there was widespread suspicion that although food was available, it was not 
reaching local citizens because of profiteering, primarily because of illegal 
exports to impoverished Tanzania and war-torn Uganda, Undoubtedly Kenya's 
relative lack of grain storage facilities did force the government to sell 
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some surplus maize, rather than risk spoilage, but many people, both within 
and outside the government, felt that somehow there should have been enough 
surplus to cope with the crisis of 1980. Instead Kenya was forced to import 
several hundred tons of maize and wheat from Europe and America, until by late 
1980 the famine subsided. 
Along the coast the Mijikenda gave this famine two names indicative of 
their perception of their condition and its causes. Some people refer to it as 
Nzala ya Pesa Si Ki tu (KiSwahili), the famine when "money is nothing," because 
even though you have money, it is worthless because there is no food in the 
store which you can buy.BO Other people refer to it as Nzala ya Makusudi 
(Mij ikenda vernacular), "the famine of deception," because it is not really a 
famine, only a condition caused by people hoarding food. The Mijikenda argue 
that there was food in Kenya but it was not being distributed, and even when 
some of it reached the local shops, it was deliberately with-held by 
store-owners in order to feed themselves and their families until the next 
shipment arrived.Bl During most of 1980 there were long lines of customers 
at local stores _ and people were limited in the amount of maize flour, the 
staple of the Kenyan diet, that they could buy. In some instances the 
Administrative Police had to be stationed in markets in order t_o prevent 
fighting over the scarce food supplies. 
The Mijikenda survived this famine as much of Kenya did because of 
international relief. Even though _palm growers could still sell palm wine, 
there was no local maize crop that they could buy with the money earned from 
wine sales. Eating cassava and coconuts curbed hunger, but the demand for 
maize flour created tensions throughout the coast. Because the Maize Marketing 
Board bought up so much of the local surplus of grain, few farmers had 
reserves to sell or consume themselves, and palm wine merchants no longer 
could depend on the traditional networks of exchange that brought cereal from 
Duruma, Giriama and Kambe territory into Rabai, and sent palm wine into those 
areas. Being a food-importing and palm wine-exporting region came to be a 
serious weakness in the overall context of Kenya's political economy. 
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